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Abstract : Should consumers’ preference for ‘green’ products help justify,
from a WTO perspective, emerging regulations such as restrictions on trade in
non-sustainable biofuels? Despite the role consumer preferences have played
in WTO disputes, in association with the ‘ like’ products concept, there has not
been enough focused examination of their speciﬁc inﬂuence, particularly in
disputes on ethical public policy issues, such as environmental or health
regulations. To this end, this paper examines key GATT Article III disputes,
pointing out that they included attempts both to measure, and also to interpret,
consumer preferences. The latter approach becomes more tempting when
consumer preferences are diﬃcult to measure; import bans or restrictions
associated with ethical public policy regulations can bring about such a situation.
A hypothetical dispute about EC biofuels sustainability criteria demonstrates this
problem. Options to make the concept of consumer preferences more coherent
include limitations on how they can be invoked, and an increased commitment to
capturing them through measurement.
1. Introduction
Consumer preferences and Article III
This paper focuses on how consumer preferences have been interpreted and
applied in deliberation of WTO disputes under the GATT National Treatment
Principle (‘Article III ’). The entry point for the analysis is the concept of ‘ like’
products. This concept, which recurs throughout the GATT andWTOAgreements,
is an inﬂuential aspect of WTO law in general (Choi, 2003). The consideration of
what constitutes ‘ like’ products has diﬀered both between, and within, relevant
Articles, and the slightly varied phrasing of these Articles also inﬂuences their
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interpretation. However, the basic concept is that less favourable treatment should
not be awarded to ‘ like’ products, regardless of their origin.
Article III generally stipulates that, with regard to regulations, imported pro-
ducts must be treated the same way as domestic products. The majority of Article
III disputes fall under either Article III(2), which speciﬁcally addresses taxation, or
Article III(4), which addresses other forms of regulation. The ﬁrst step in de-
termining whether a national tax or regulation discriminates against imported
products, thus constituting an Article III violation, is to determine whether two
products, domestic (favoured) and imported (unfavoured), are ‘ like’. If they are,
the dispute settlement bodies, which consist of the Panel and the Appellate Body
(‘AB’), then consider whether the measure is discriminatory. The interpretation of
the term ‘like’ thus outlines the boundary of Article III’s jurisdiction.
When establishing whether products are ‘ like’, consumer preferences are
an important consideration, for two reasons. First, as will be further discussed,
Article III jurisprudence demonstrates that ‘ likeness’ is determined in the market-
place, based upon consumers’ perceptions of whether goods are in a competitive
relationship with one another. Second, ‘consumer tastes and habits ’ form one of
four traditional criteria, drawn from a 1970 GATT Border Tax Adjustment
Working Party report (‘BTA criteria’), utilized to determine whether products are
‘ like’. These include: ‘ the product’s end-uses in a given market ; consumers ’ tastes
and habits, which change from country to country ; the product’s properties,
nature and quality’ (GATT, 1970: 3) [Emphasis added].1 This paper uses the term
‘consumer preferences’, rather than simply the GATT criterion’s ‘consumer tastes
and habits ’, to avoid confusion, as the inﬂuence of consumer preferences goes
beyond the application of this criterion, and includes a broader consideration of
product competitiveness.
The BTA criteria are meant to deﬁne what ‘ like’ means, and product competi-
tiveness is an essential component of ‘ likeness ’. However, it has not been clearly
established that the BTA criteria are intended to add somehow up to a deﬁnition of
competitiveness. The two enquiries seem to operate in parallel, sometimes over-
lapping.2 Overall, the approach varies widely, and there is not much consistency
from dispute to dispute, or generalized guidance.
In the GATT Agreement, as well as the other WTO Agreements, there are
very few explicit mentions of consumers, and none in Article III.3 Though it is
not amandatory aspect of Article III deliberation, of the 20 disputes that have fallen
1 In a later Article III dispute, the Panel amended the list to include the customs classiﬁcation, or HS
Code, of the product.
2 In some disputes, for example Japan–Film, the Chile–Alcoholic Beverages Panel Report, and
EC–Bananas III, discussions of competitiveness, including reference to consumers, occur independent of
any citation of the BTA criterion. Available at: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ﬁnd_dispu_cases_
e.htm
3 One mention of consumers occurs in each of the following: GATT Articles IX and XI; WTO GATS
Agreement, and the TRIPS Agreement.
166 EMILY BARRETT LYDGATE
under Article III since the WTO’s formation in 1995, 14 cite the BTA criteria,4 and
more than half utilize consumer preferences in coming to their conclusions, often
through analysis of whether products are competitive with one another.5
Recently, it has been suggested that consumer preferences could play a special
role in WTO disputes that have to do with public policy regulations, speciﬁcally
with regard to emerging regulations that respond to climate change (Vranes,
2010: 11). This is because products otherwise ‘ like’ from a WTO perspective
might seem distinct from the perspective of consumers. For example, consumers
might prefer goods that have been produced with low carbon emissions, and see
them as diﬀerent from conventional goods. In much the same way, consumer
preferences would also be relevant in a potential dispute on biofuels sustainability
criteria, a controversial set of EC regulations discussed in this paper. Yet, in spite
of ongoing controversy about the treatment of environmental regulation in the
WTO, and scrutiny of the Appellate Body approach to such disputes, not much
targeted analysis has been undertaken of how consumer preferences have inﬂu-
enced past disputes on ethical public policy regulations, and how they should be
interpreted in the future. Indeed, much of the existing literature has analysed, from
an economic perspective, the best methodologies for determining ‘ like’ products
(cf. Berg, 1996; Choi, 2003). An economic approach to ‘ like’ products faces par-
ticular challenges when confronted by such public policy regulations. This paper
will examine these challenges (from a legal, rather than economic, perspective) by
contrasting the economic approach taken in Japan–Alcohol with the approach
taken in EC–Asbestos, a dispute that raised more diﬃcult ethical questions.
While the focus here is on Article III, whose disputes include an abundance
of jurisprudence about consumer preferences, a parallel analysis might be under-
taken of disputes under other WTO Agreements, which also contain the concept
of ‘ like products ’, for example within the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (‘TBT Agreement’), or the Most Favoured Nation Principle (‘MFN
Principle’).
Approaches to consumer preferences
This paper focuses on two Article III disputes : Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages6 and European Communities–Measures Aﬀecting Asbestos and
4 See: US–Gasoline, Japan–Alcohol, Canada–Periodicals, Indonesia–Autos, Dominican Republic–
Cigarettes, Mexico–Soft Drinks, Korea–Alcoholic Beverages, EC–Asbestos, Canada–Autos, Korea–Beef,
Canada–Wheat Exports, EC–Commercial Vessels, US–FSC, Brazil–Tyres, available at http://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ﬁnd_dispu_cases_e.htm
5 See: Japan–Alcohol, Canada–Periodicals, Indonesia–Autos, Dominican Republic–Cigarettes,
Mexico–Soft Drinks, Korea–Alcoholic Beverages, Chile–Alcoholic Beverages, EC–Bananas III,
Japan–Film, EC–Asbestos, Canada–Autos, Korea–Beef, Canada–Wheat Exports, Brazil–Tyres, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ﬁnd_dispu_cases_e.htm
6 Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R; WT/DS10/R; WT/DS11/R (11 July 1996); and
WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R; WT/DS11/AB/R (4 October 1996) (hereinafter Japan–Alcohol), avail-
able at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ﬁnd_dispu_cases_e.htm
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Asbestos-Containing Products7 Others have also included substantial analysis of
consumer preferences. However, the selected disputes, as well as providing im-
portant benchmarks in Article III jurisprudence, also well illustrate a spectrum of
interpretive possibility.
In Japan–Alcohol, the dispute settlement bodies utilized what this paper calls
an objective approach to consumer preference.8 This approach emphasized the
importance of ‘objective’ BTA criteria, such as how products appeared
(‘ the product’s properties, nature and quality’) and were used (‘the product’s
end-uses in a given market ’), as opposed to ‘subjective ’ consumer preferences,
such as traditional patterns of consumption.
Further, the dispute emphasized the importance of a competitive market re-
lationship between products, from a consumer perspective, as a way to determine
their ‘ likeness’ (Bronckers and McNelis, 2000: 347). To establish competitive-
ness, the objective analysis of consumer preferences was approached economically.
For example, the parties utilized elasticity of substitution studies to measure
whether consumers would switch to one disputed alcoholic beverage if the price of
the other rose.
In EC–Asbestos, the dispute settlement bodies faced a very diﬀerent set of cir-
cumstances. None of the disputing parties had submitted any evidence, market-
based or otherwise, about consumer preferences. In part, this reﬂected the fact
that, rather than many individuals, asbestos was purchased by few, industrial
consumers, which made their preferences more diﬃcult to quantify. Further, the
measure in question was a public health regulation, which raised ethical concerns
for consumers. The Panel applied the same ‘objective’ approach, concluding that
consumer preference, as it could not be measured, was not a relevant consider-
ation.
The AB disagreed, asserting that consumers would not prefer asbestos. This
conclusion was not based in evidence, but common sense, grounded in inter-
national standards. Though their reasoning represented a departure from the ob-
jective approach described above, they disingenuously presented it as objective.
They did so by basing their argument on likely quantitative impacts in the market
(a negative competition eﬀect), and the objective BTA criterion of physical
characteristics of the products in question, which then aﬀected consumer pre-
ferences.
EC–Asbestos brings up a fundamental question: should this approach be gen-
eralized, so that the AB can interpret what constitutes consumer preference when
dealing with normative regulations that limit, or eliminate, the ability of con-
sumers to choose, and thus have their preferences measured? If this approach is
7 European Communities–Measures Aﬀecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/
DS135/R (18 September 2000); and WT/DS135/AB/R (12 March 2001) (hereinafter EC–Asbestos),
available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ﬁnd_dispu_cases_e.htm
8 This term is borrowed from another analysis, also referenced later, which characterizes the dispute
settlement bodies’ general approach to Japan–Alcohol as ‘objective’ (Horn and Weiler, 2003).
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not permissible, should consumer preferences just be disregarded, despite their
relevance to such an important public policy decision?
Preliminary analysis
Considering the diﬀerent strategies employed in these two disputes, it is possible to
simply assert that the interpretation of consumer preferences has been inconsistent,
and even illogical. However, it is perhaps more useful to examine the causes be-
hind these discrepancies, and what they reveal about the challenges of capturing
consumer preferences more generally. In EC–Asbestos, the AB evaluated consumer
preferences, and product ‘ likeness ’, without reference to evidence of competitive-
ness between the products. For this to occur, the public policy at issue needed to
represent a fairly unambiguous consensual societal norm, such as human health, as
well as a situation where objective evidence about consumer preferences was not
available, or diﬃcult to obtain. In such a situation, it became politically diﬃcult to
keep consumer preference, and the associated public policy goal of supporting
human health, out of Article III, due to the potential for public backlash.
The dispute settlement bodies’ approach to consumer preferences reﬂects oft-
discussed strategies of Article III interpretation employed more broadly in each
dispute. Thus, considering the inﬂuence of consumer preferences involves grap-
pling with some of the same controversies that they raised. Principal among these
is the question of whether, under Article III, product ‘ likeness ’ is determined solely
by product competitiveness. On the other hand, can public policy goals that in-
form how the product is regulated make one product unlike another? In other
words, to what extent should the types of concerns addressed under Article XX,
the General Exception, be considered within the ‘likeness ’ test of Article III?
In this sense, consumer preferences raise some of the same questions as the ‘aim-
and-eﬀect ’ test, an approach to interpreting product ‘ likeness ’ whose rejection
forms an interrelated theme of the disputes in question. This approach was rejected
on the basis that it unduly empowered a government’s unprovable claim: that its
aim in setting a regulation was not to discriminate. Consumer preferences would
seem not to have much in common with this approach, as they represent the col-
lective behaviours of individuals, rather than the discretion of a single government.
Also, consumer preferences are an objectively measured entity, rather than an
unprovable claim.
Or are they? In EC–Asbestos, consumer preferences had two important features
in common with ‘aim-and-eﬀect ’. First, they provided a tool (though used rather
disingenuously) for broadening the scope of what constituted ‘like’ products, to
include public policy considerations. Second, they stood in for a discretionary
approach to determining the validity of a regulation, though employed by the AB,
rather than a national government.
Perhaps one reason this occurred is that, while ‘aim and eﬀect ’ has been re-
jected, consumer preferences still play an important role in Article III dispute de-
liberation. Future public policy disputes that fall under Article III will likely
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provoke the same problems and concerns, even if not so strongly as in
EC–Asbestos. The potential for correlation between products with import bans or
restrictions, products that generate strong ethical preferences from consumers, and
products that come under scrutiny for violating WTO rules such as Article III,
suggests that the measurement of consumer preferences forms an important area of
enquiry. To explore further the problems that consumer preferences raise, the
paper then considers the illustrative example of a hypothetical dispute on EC
sustainability standards for biofuels.
The EC has developed sustainability standards to regulate how imported and
domestic biofuels are produced. A biofuels-exporting country might argue that
sustainable and non-sustainable biofuels are ‘ like’ products, and that the regu-
lation discriminates unfairly against imports, thereby violating Article III(4). As in
EC–Asbestos, the biofuels supply chain would likely make it diﬃcult to quantify
consumer preferences. To complicate things further, a common sense determi-
nation is probably more diﬃcult than in the example of carcinogenic asbestos.
Thus, an approach based on measurement might be diﬃcult ; an approach based
on interpretation would leave a huge amount of discretion to the AB to decide the
importance of sustainability to consumers. ‘EC–Biofuels ’ is useful for illustrating
the diﬃculties that arise regarding consumer preferences in public policy disputes,
when ‘common sense’ becomes less common.
2. Article III : a brief overview
The majority of Article III complaints cite violations of either paragraph 2 or
paragraph 4. Both are interpreted with reference to the same chapeau. Both
paragraphs focus on internal regulatory measures and whether they favour dom-
estic products ; Article III(2) deals with taxation, and Article III(4) regulation.
Article III(1), the chapeau, reads:
The Members recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws,
regulations and requirements aﬀecting the internal sale, oﬀering for sale, pur-
chase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative
regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in speciﬁed
amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products
so as to aﬀord protection to domestic production.
Article III(2) reads:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly,
to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those
applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no con-
tracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to
imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in
paragraph 1.
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The second sentence has an interpretive note, which reads:
A tax conforming to the requirements of the ﬁrst sentence of paragraph 2 would
be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only
in cases where competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed
product, and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product
which was not similarly taxed.
In the ﬁrst sentence of Article III(2), there are two key questions. First, are the
domestic and imported products ‘ like’? Second, if they are ‘ like’, is the imported
product taxed ‘ in excess of ’ the domestic product? In the second sentence of
Article III(2), combined with the Interpretive Note and Article III(1), to which it
explicitly refers, the ﬁrst key question is : are the imported and domestic product
‘directly competitive or substitutable’. If so, are the two products ‘not similarly
taxed’, and, ﬁnally, does dissimilar taxation operate in a manner ‘so as to aﬀord
protection’ to domestic production?
Article III(4) reads:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory
of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements aﬀecting their internal sale, oﬀering for sale, pur-
chase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall
not prevent the application of diﬀerential internal transportation charges which
are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and
not on the nationality of the product.
The key questions are: ﬁrst, are the domestic and imported products ‘ like’?
Second, if they are, is the imported product receiving treatment ‘no less favour-
able’ than that accorded to the domestic product? This paragraph does not include
the concept of ‘directly competitive or substitutable ’.
As part of the legislative matrix available under Article III, in the event that the
measure in dispute has been adopted in support of a public policy goal, such as
protection of human health or exhaustible natural resources, or the prevention of
deceptive practices, inter alia, a Member State can defend their tax or regulatory
measure under Article XX, the General Exception. A measure found to violate
Article III may be justiﬁed under Article XX if, in the language of the chapeau, it is
‘not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjusti-
ﬁable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade’.
3. Case study 1: Japan-Alcohol
The dispute
In 1996, the newly formed WTO faced its ﬁrst Article III dispute,
Japan–Alcohol, which followed from a 1987 GATT dispute, and had many similar
Consumer preferences and the National Treatment Principle 171
elements.9 In the GATT dispute, the EEC argued that, although Japan’s taxation
policy with regard to alcoholic beverages was origin-neutral, it violated
Article III(2). They claimed that the policy was both protective and discriminatory,
as it levied higher taxes on imported ‘like’ products, such as whisky and vodka,
than domestic products, such as Japanese shochu. Japan argued that its intent was
non-discriminatory. Rather, liquor tax was levied according to the tax-bearing
ability. Japan also claimed that traditional shochu was not ‘ like’ vodka and other
competitors. The Panel dismissed Japan’s argument about the non-discriminatory
intent of its measure, concluding that a wide range of the beverages in question
was ‘ like’, and that the taxation system discriminated against imported alcoholic
beverages.
Japan–Alcohol, in 1996, followed from the GATT Japan–Alcohol. The US, EC,
and Canada charged that there was still de facto discrimination against imported
alcohol under Article III(2), even after the 1987 GATT ruling. Japan had re-
sponded to the 1987 dispute by changing its laws, but put in place an excise tax
reduction for small producers of shochu. Also, Japan continued to tax ‘white ’ and
‘brown’ liquor diﬀerently, which the complainants charged was a discriminatory
practice; in particular, they argued that (brown) whisky was ‘directly competitive
or substitutable’ to (white) Japanese shochu (Panel Report, section III :
paras. 3.1–3.4).
One of the core debates of both disputes concerned consumer preferences : were
the diﬀerences consumers perceived between shochu, Japan’s traditional alcoholic
beverage, and imported alcoholic spirits signiﬁcant enough to determine that the
products were not ‘ like’ or ‘directly competitive or substitutable ’? The dispute
settlement bodies’ response to this question demonstrated what this paper is
calling the ‘objective’ approach to consumer preferences.
The objective approach to consumer preferences
This approach explicitly embraced aspects of consumer preferences that were ob-
servable, measurable, and quantiﬁable. The 1987 GATT Panel Report illustrated
some components of the objective approach. In coming to its decision, the 1996
Panel Report also quoted this section of the 1987 Report :
[Thus, even] though the Panel was of the view that the ‘ likeness’ of products
must be examined taking into account not only objective criteria (such as com-
position and manufacturing processes of products) but also the more subjective
consumers’ viewpoint (such as consumption and use by consumers) the Panel
agreed_ that Japanese shochu (Group A) and vodka could be considered as
‘ like’ products in terms of Article III :2 because they were both white/clean spirits,
made of similar raw materials, and their end-uses were virtually identical.
(para. 5.7) [Emphasis added]
9 GATT Panel Report on Japan–Prohibition of Alcoholic Beverages, L/6216–34S/83 (13 October
1987), available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm
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The Panel established a hierarchy of value between subjective and objective com-
ponents of the ‘ like’ products determination. They asserted that physical charac-
teristics (which can be observed) and product end-uses (which examine not what
consumers feel about a product, but what they can do with it) were more decisive
BTA criteria than ‘subjective consumers’ viewpoint’. This paragraph suggested
that these, here deﬁned as ‘consumption and use by consumers’, were not inﬂu-
ential at all. (In EC–Asbestos we will see that this hierarchy was still in operation,
but in a more nested way: consumer preferences were made ‘objective’ by being
measured using these ‘objective’ BTA criteria.)
In another section quoted by the 1996 Report, the 1987 Panel aﬃrmed that
since, as ‘ the aim of Article III :2_ could not be achieved if diﬀerential taxes could
be used to crystallize consumer preference for traditional domestic products, the
Panel found that the traditional Japanese consumer habits with regard to shochu
provided no reason for not considering vodka to be a ‘‘ like’’ product’ (para. 5.7).
In other words, taxation measures should not interfere with consumer preferences,
whose basis should be the free market, rather than the inﬂuence of government
taxation. The ﬁnal aspect of the ‘objective’ approach was the quantiﬁcation
of consumer preferences, to establish the market competitiveness of products in
dispute.
The objective approach and the rejection of ‘aim and eﬀect ’
By examining the GATT Report, we can deduce that ‘subjective consumers ’
viewpoints’ referred to two of Japan’s arguments: ﬁrst, shochu was a traditional
beverage and thus consumers perceived it diﬀerently. Second, consumers perceived
imported alcoholic beverages as luxury products.10 Japan called upon this second
argument to justify its intent, which, it stated, was not to discriminate against
imports, but rather to tax based upon tax-bearing ability.11
Japan presented similar arguments on both points in 1996, arguing that
the products were diﬀerentiated by the ways in which they were consumed. For
example, shochu was drunk before dinner; vodka after dinner. Many shochu
drinkers added hot water to the drink, which they did not do to other spirits
(Panel Report, para. 4.54). These diﬀerences resulted from the fact that shochu
was a traditional beverage, and the others were not. Further, Japan claimed that
its taxation system was based upon the principle of ‘horizontal equity ’, so that
tax/price ratios were consistent between all alcoholic beverages (Panel Report,
para. 4.19; 4.71). In other words, wealthier consumers’ preference for luxury
imported alcohol justiﬁed the tax diﬀerential. In adopting this argument, Japan
10 See Japan–AlcoholGATT report: Paragraph 3.1 (b) explains the tax system; (f) describes consumer
perceptions of whisky as a ‘ luxury good’.
11 The Panel rejected Japan’s approach to taxation, because it rested on ‘necessarily subjective as-
sumptions about future competition and inevitably uncertain consumer responses’ (GATT Report 5.13)
[Italics added]. The implication: as goods become globalized, familiarity increases, and consumers may
become more comfortable with what they previously saw as luxury goods.
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speciﬁcally advocated the application of an ‘aim-and-eﬀect ’ test. Under this test,
the dispute settlement bodies’ consideration of whether products were ‘ like’ under
Article III would have included an examination of whether the intent or ‘aim’ of
the tax was to protect domestic products.
Critical analyses have characterized the dispute settlement bodies’ approach to
Japan–Alcohol as ‘objective’ (Horn andWeiler, 2003: 31), ‘ formalist ’ (Trebilcock
and Howse, 2005: 90), or ‘end-use’ (Choi, 2003: 21). Though these analyses
diﬀer, they all note that the dispute settlement bodies dismissed not only Japan’s
argument that its intent was non-discriminatory, but also the justiﬁcation of a
measure based on intent : the ‘aim-and-eﬀect ’ test. This dismissal became a con-
sistent strategy in Article III.
The Panel’s dismissal of aim and eﬀect rested on the logic that it redoubled
the purpose of Article XX, which contains a ‘deﬁnitive list of grounds justifying
departure from obligations that are otherwise incorporated in Article III ’
(Panel Report, para. 6.17). If, as the Panel asserted, the ‘aim’ of the measure does
include the type of issues addressed under Article XX, then its rejection has another
important implication, fundamental to the objective approach: it narrows the
scope of Article III. Rejecting the ‘aim-and-eﬀect ’ test implies that extra-market
issues will be considered as exceptions, rather than being a part of the initial de-
termination of whether products are ‘ like’. This rejection echoed the 1987 GATT
Panel’s assertion that taxation should not crystallize consumer preferences. The
Panel aﬃrmed the market basis of the Article III ‘ like’ products determination.
In their dismissal of aim and eﬀect, the dispute settlement bodies also argued
that Japan was utilizing subjective arguments, such as analysis of traditional
patterns of consumption, to support an unprovable claim of its ‘ intent ’. Japan had
explained its ‘aim’, and justiﬁed this aim as non-discriminatory with reference to
its analysis of consumer preferences. The dispute settlement bodies equated ‘aim’
with a subjective approach to consumer preferences, and the problem of subjec-
tivity in general : how can you prove an ‘aim’? By the extension of their own logic,
ethical concerns dealt with under Article XX might be categorized as subjective.
Given the hierarchy of importance between subjective and objective, this would be
a cause for concern.
An econometric approach
Thus far, this analysis has focused on the criteria for determining consumer pre-
ferences as part of the consideration of ‘ like’ products, and the rejection of aim
and eﬀect in this context. On this topic, the Panel suggested one principal danger
of a subjective approach to consumer preferences: a government might use factors,
such as traditional patterns of consumption, to support an unprovable claim of its
intent. However, we have not discussed the eﬃcacy of its alternative: a proof
based, objective approach.
A positive ‘objective’ approach to consumer preferences is best demonstrated in
the dispute settlement bodies’ examination of ‘directly competitive or substitutable’
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products. After determining that vodka and shochu were ‘ like’, they turned their
attention to the remaining alcoholic beverages in dispute, and whether they ﬁt into
this broader category of comparison.12
Japan–Alcohol is noteworthy for having developed perhaps the most econo-
metric approach of any Article III dispute (Horn and Mavroidis, 2004: 62), which
reﬂected an overall emphasis on market competitiveness. The Panel Report stated
that ‘ in the Panel’s view, the wording makes it clear that the appropriate test to
deﬁne whether two products are ‘‘ like’’ ’ or ‘‘directly competitive or substitutable
products ’’ is the marketplace. The Panel recalled_ the words used in the
Interpretative Note ad Article III, paragraph 2, namely ‘‘where competition
exists ’’ : competition exists by deﬁnition in markets’ (Panel Report, para. 6.22).
The AB broadly agreed with this interpretation (AB Report, para. 25).
The dispute settlement bodies used econometric methods to measure compe-
tition. Both the Panel and the AB had asserted the importance of elasticity
of substitution as ‘the decisive criterion’ in determining whether the alcoholic
beverages were ‘directly competitive or substitutable ’ (Panel Report, para. 6.22;
AB Report, Section 2(a) para. 55).
One of the main products in dispute was whisky. Japan used elasticity of sub-
stitution studies to argue that an increase in the price of shochu would not cause
signiﬁcant numbers of consumers to switch to whisky, or vice-versa. Japan cited a
study conducted by its Institute for Social Studies, which found that, in either case,
only 10% of consumers would switch. Also, the study found no signiﬁcant impact
on whisky consumption based on the price of shochu, or vice versa (Panel Report,
para. 4.85). The complainants found fault with Japan’s study, pointing out pro-
cedural errors, such as the way that the time-series model was calculated, and the
need for more variables which might alter consumer behaviour. They introduced
separate surveys, which indicated that there had been a negative competitiveness
eﬀect of high taxes of whisky, as compared with shochu (Panel Report, para. 4.82).
The Panel had to interpret these competing claims. In the end, they rejected
Japan’s 10% ﬁgure, as it was obtained in the context of the current pricing regime,
the subject of dispute. Here, a tax seen as distorting the market was cause to
invalidate Japan’s evidence regarding consumer preferences. This rationale recalls
the GATT Japan–Alcohol Panel Report statement, that a tax measure should not
crystallize consumer preferences. The Panel then stated that, even so, 10% elas-
ticity was suﬃcient to prove direct competitiveness or substitutability (para. 6.31).
The AB agreed that the beverages were directly competitive or substitutable
(section 2(a) para. 56).
In this example, econometric analysis was no ‘objective’ silver bullet ; it de-
manded discretion on the part of the dispute settlement bodies in order to answer
12 The AB interpreted ‘like products’ in the ﬁrst sentence as being deﬁned narrowly; while ‘directly
competitive or substitutable’ products are deﬁned more broadly (see the AB Report, sections. H:1(a)
H:2(a)).
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questions such as: how much cross-price elasticity was necessary? Which econo-
metric techniques and studies were most reliable? Certainly, given the imperfection
of the econometric tools, the dichotomy between subjective and objective should
not be too neatly drawn.
However, despite these imperfections, an econometric approach such as this
seems to represent the best possible attempt to capture consumer preferences
in a way that conforms to the objective approach the dispute settlement bodies
intended. The approach was consistent with a market-based interpretation,
translating consumer preferences into competitiveness indices. It was also made
possible by the fact that consumers were choosing between products on the shelf,
and could express their preferences clearly in a quantiﬁable way. Consumer pre-
ferences could be captured through an explicitly market-based approach. In this
sense, Japan–Alcohol forms an illustrative contrast with EC–Asbestos.
4. Case study 2: EC–Asbestos
The dispute
Under Article III(4), Canada challenged an import ban that France had imposed
on chrysotile asbestos, as it was a known carcinogen. Rather than imposing a ban,
Canada argued France could have instituted special installation and maintenance
procedures that would lessen the carcinogenic eﬀect. This would be a less trade-
restrictive approach. France defended its ban as a public health protection regu-
lation.
Canada argued that two types of products, its asbestos and France’s substitute,
were ‘ like’ with respect to all of the BTA criteria (Panel Report, para. 3.419). With
regard to ‘consumer tastes and habits ’, they asserted that as the products were not
for mass, but instead industrial, consumption, normal consumers found them to be
virtually identical. Therefore, there was no reason to diﬀerentiate between the
two (Panel Report, para. 3.422). The EC disagreed that the products were ‘ like’.
With respect to physical characteristics, they pointed out that the smaller diameter
of asbestos ﬁbres, a diﬀering physical property, made them carcinogenic (Panel
Report, para. 3.431). When it came to ‘consumer tastes and habits ’, however, they
dismissed the criterion altogether, as it was only industrial consumers who pur-
chased the product.
To resolve the diﬀering claims about the ‘ likeness’ of the products’ physical
characteristics, the Panel determined that the products must not just be viewed in
terms of chemical properties, whose diﬀerences might be minute, but also in the
context of markets. Thus, they aﬃrmed the market-based approach taken in
Japan–Alcohol.13The Panel did not think that diﬀerences in physical characteristics,
13 The AB stated that the deﬁnition of ‘ like’ products should be somewhere in between Article III(2)’s
‘ like products’ and ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ products (paras. 92–96). This approach to
‘likeness’ in Article III(4) has been broadly accepted.
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or the end-uses of the products, were signiﬁcant enough to diﬀerentiate the pro-
ducts (para. 8.122). The Panel then stated:
We note ﬁrst of all that the risk of a product for human or animal health has
never been used as a factor of comparison by panels entrusted with applying the
concept of ‘ likeness’ within the meaning of Article III. In addition to the fact that
no other panel has probably ever been called upon to examine a question similar
to the one before us, in our view the reason is to be found in the economy of the
GATT 1994. Its primordial role is to ensure that a certain number of disciplines
are applied to domestic trade regulations. Article XX of the GATT, however,
recognizes that certain interests may take precedence over the rules governing
international trade and authorizes the adoption of trade measures aimed at
preserving these interests while at the same time observing certain criteria.
(para. 8.129)
This analysis reiterates the Japan–Alcohol rejection of ‘aim and eﬀect’, as
it would replicate the purpose of Article XX. Finally, the Panel concluded that,
although the two products were ‘ like, and therefore the import ban violated
Article III(4), it did satisfy the conditions of Article XX(b).14 On this basis, they did
not recommend that France remove the ban. Though the AB agreed that the ban
could remain, they disagreed with the way that the Panel came to this conclusion;
a feature of their disagreement was the Panel’s treatment of consumer preferences.
How to measure consumer preferences
In Japan–Alcohol, while a good deal of attention was given to consumers, in
particular as they related to competition, their inﬂuence was deﬁned narrowly, in
the sense that they were choosing between ‘like’ products based upon small price
diﬀerentials in the marketplace. However, in EC–Asbestos, consumers did not
have market choice. Asbestos is an industrial product, with industrial consumers,
so it would be more diﬃcult to obtain the type of data used in Japan–Alcohol. The
Panel felt that it was too diﬃcult to determine precisely the tastes and habits of
consumers in France before the asbestos ban. Also, consumer preferences were
inevitably varied. Therefore, the criteria would not provide clear results. They
refrained from taking a position (para. 8.139).
In fact, based on the impossibility of assessing consumer preferences in an ‘ob-
jective’ manner, neither Canada, nor the EC, nor the Panel considered consumer
preferences to be a compelling aspect of their argument (paras. 3.419–3.431;
8.139). In a broader sense, this reveals a limitation in approaching consumer pre-
ferences through quantitative analysis ; it becomes less applicable in certain types
of product supply chains.
Though the Panel’s ﬁnding was consistent with Japan–Alcohol’s objective
approach to consumers, the AB criticized the Panel’s omission of ‘consumer tastes
and habits ’ as a criterion for determining whether the two products were ‘ like’.
14 Article XX(b) deals with measures ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’.
Consumer preferences and the National Treatment Principle 177
Again aﬃrming the Japan–Alcohol approach, the AB aﬃrmed that this criterion
was particularly important as Article III dealt with competitive relationships. They
stated:
We do not wish to speculate on what the evidence regarding these consumers
would have indicated; rather, we wish to highlight that consumers’ tastes and
habits regarding ﬁbres, even in the case of commercial parties, such as manu-
facturers, are very likely to be shaped by the health risks associated with a
product which is known to be highly carcinogenic. A manufacturer cannot, for
instance, ignore the preferences of the ultimate consumer of its products. If the
risks posed by a particular product are suﬃciently great, the ultimate consumer
may simply cease to buy that product. This would, undoubtedly, aﬀect a manu-
facturer’s decisions in the marketplace. (paras. 103–104) [Emphasis added]
Here, the AB attempted to include consumer preferences in an analysis of
competition. As the words ‘very likely’ demonstrate, it revealed their interpretation
of consumer preference, particularly as none of the disputing parties had made any
claims about it. The interpretation was based on a strong common-sense
argument, grounded in international standards and guidelines, that consumers
would not want to purchase a substance with known carcinogenic properties
(World Health Organization, 1998, para. 144). Therefore, unlike the Panel, the AB
assumed that consumer preferences could be interpreted in a normative fashion.
But presumably, in Canada, industrial consumers did purchase the product.
Neither Canada, nor any of the other disputing parties, had submitted studies on
consumer preferences and asbestos to substantiate any claim. The Panel’s argument
that ‘consumer tastes and habits ’ are varied seems more plausible than the AB’s
argument that they are normative. Further, the logic of the Panel is more consistent
with Japan–Alcohol, and an objective view of consumer preferences. Using this
approach, public health concerns are addressed under Article XX, which deals
with them explicitly. As the Panel pointed out, they were never introduced into the
‘like’ products determination itself.
However, there was a problem with the Panel’s logic: it created the potential for
a legitimacy crisis (Howse and Tuerk, 2001). By deeming a carcinogenic and non-
carcinogenic product ‘ like’, the Panel appeared insensitive to public health
concerns. Their reasoning demonstrated a public relations risk of jettisoning extra-
market considerations to Article XX, when considering regulations with consumer
protection objectives.
The AB was forced to abandon an objective approach to consumer preferences
because of these limitations, and adapt a discretionary, subjective, interpretation,
which this paper calls a common-sense approach. However, they did not ac-
knowledge this. After aﬃrming the importance of ‘consumer tastes and habits ’,
the AB questioned the Panel’s ﬁnding that the two products were ‘ like’, but be-
cause there was not enough evidence that the products had similar physical
characteristics. In so doing, they adopted the EC’s argument about diﬀering
particle diameter. Then, they interpreted consumer preferences through physical
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characteristics. The diﬀerent molecular properties that led one product to be car-
cinogenic were the reason for consumers’ distinction between the products, and
thereby made the products uncompetitive.
The AB presented their approach as ‘objective ’. ‘Consumer tastes and habits ’
were based upon market competitiveness between products, and interpreted in the
light of other, more objective BTA criteria of physical characteristics. The AB
stated that they did not want to speculate about consumer preferences, but that
very speculation seemed to form the substantive justiﬁcation for the diﬀeren-
tiation. Further, considering that many ‘like’ products diﬀer on a molecular level,
their argument about physical characteristics does not seem that rigorous.
While the AB claimed they were evaluating the products based on their
competitive relationship, it could easily be argued that their rationale reﬂected a
subjective aim and eﬀect approach. Under the ‘likeness ’ test itself, rather than
under Article XX, the AB honoured the fact that the aim of the regulation was to
protect consumers, even though its eﬀect was to eliminate trade in this product.
They thus introduced an extra-market dimension into the ‘ like’ products deter-
mination.
They also overstepped an important boundary. Findings of fact, based in in-
terpretation of the evidence of the dispute, are the responsibility of the Panel. The
AB, on the other hand, is empowered only to make ﬁndings of law, derived directly
from legal principles. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of this decision is not
that they made a ﬁnding based upon no evidence, but that they made a ﬁnding of
fact at all. However, the AB did not acknowledge this breach. Instead, they ﬁnally
concluded that, though they would not agree with the Panel that the products were
‘ like’, there was not enough evidence to prove they were unlike.
With regards to consumer preferences, EC–Asbestos seems to oﬀer a lose–lose
situation. If, following the Panel, consumer preferences are interpreted as ‘varied’,
and therefore irrelevant, there is no basis for incorporating consumer preferences
into an important public policy decision. However, when consumer preferences
were deﬁned by the AB’s discretion, this involved a transfer of power, presented as
an ‘objective’ evaluation of product competition and physical diﬀerences. There is
a gap between the stated approach and the content of the decision. Though the
ends were good, from the perspective that they humanized the decision, the means
were bad, in the sense that they opened up the potential (which perhaps will never
be realized) for a future overstepping of discretion.
In this dispute, a market-bound determination on ‘likeness ’ under Article III had
its limitations. Had product ‘ likeness ’ been evaluated on the basis of health im-
pacts, rather than product competitiveness, the AB’s assessment would have
been logical. Horn and Weiler term this an ‘alternative comparator’ approach
(Horn and Weiler, 2003: 31). So far, however, the dispute settlement bodies have
resisted measuring ‘likeness ’ using any other baseline than competitiveness.
Presenting these complex value judgments as an objective evaluation is somewhat
disingenuous. Whether it is used to legitimate or to undermine national regulation,
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allowing this level of AB discretion in interpreting consumer preferences seems an
unsatisfying approach.
5. Case study 3: EC–Biofuels
The hypothetical dispute
Though biofuels have not been the subject of a trade dispute, there is the potential
for conﬂict under Article III(4). International trade in biofuels is increasing,
and the EC has developed sustainability criteria for their production, which may
present an obstacle for some imports (Swinback, 2009). The EC has stated that,
in order to count toward a 10% binding target for renewable energy in the
transportation sector, biofuels should meet these criteria (Directive 2009/28/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council, 23 April 2009). The criteria
will be applied to both domestic and imported biofuels, and provide a basis for
EU Member States to distinguish between sustainable and non-sustainable
production. Whether these provisions, when applied, will discriminate unfairly
against importers is subject to debate. There could be an Article III(4) contro-
versy if exporting countries argue that sustainable and conventional biofuels
are ‘ like’, and that sustainability regulations discriminate unfairly against im-
ports. In evaluating this argument, consumer preferences are an interesting
area to consider. Perhaps a good way to go about this is to review the three
approaches documented here, and how they would apply in this dispute: ﬁrst,
objective and quantitative; second, objective and dismissive; and, third, common
sense.
It should be noted, of course, that this is a very speculative exercise. Not only is
the dispute hypothetical, but the speciﬁc details of the submissions by the Parties
would necessarily shape the outcomes. However, without attempting to discern an
outcome, this exercise intends to outline some basic contours of the challenge with
regard to consumer preferences.
The objective approach 1: quantitative measuring
As well as consumer preferences, evaluated econometrically, Japan–Alcohol also
emphasized the importance of physical characteristics and end-uses of products
when determining whether they are ‘ like’. The criterion of product end-uses is
directly relevant to consumers. The criterion of physical characteristics, on the
other hand, operates to some extent in parallel to the consumer preferences query.
However, EC–Asbestos provided an unusual demonstration of how physical
characteristics, in this case molecular diﬀerences, might directly inﬂuence con-
sumer preferences.
In terms of both physical characteristics and end-uses, sustainable and conven-
tional biofuels would be virtually identical. Even on a molecular level, it would be
impossible to distinguish any systematic diﬀerences between, for example, palm
oil whose production has involved the clearing of virgin forest, and palm oil whose
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production has not. Therefore, physical characteristics could not justify diﬀering
consumer perceptions, as they did in EC–Asbestos.
Also, when it comes to their end-uses, sustainable and non-sustainable biofuels
are the same. In Japan–Alcohol, Japan argued that consumers drank shochu in a
traditional way; this type of argument could not be made for biofuels. Of course,
the dispute settlement bodies did not consider this a persuasive distinction on the
part of Japan. On the other hand, it is still a valid observation that, regarding end-
uses, sustainable and conventional biofuels are even more ‘ like’ than, for example,
shochu and vodka.
Both of these points play into one overarching issue: that of product distinctions
based upon processing and production methods (‘PPMs’) which have no physical
impact on the ﬁnal product, so-called non-product-related, or ‘NPR’ PPMs.
Biofuels, produced sustainably versus conventionally, provide an excellent example
of a NPR PPM-based regulatory distinction. Given the ‘ like’ products test’s em-
phasis on physical characteristics and end-uses, there has been some debate about
whether two otherwise identical products may be seen as unlike, solely because
they are produced diﬀerently.15 This is an important question for environmental
regulations in general, as many rely upon such distinctions.
Neither of the disputes analysed herein explicitly addressed the role of NPR
PPMs in establishing ‘ like’ products ; however, both emphasized the importance
of physical characteristics. This functions as a counter-argument to basing product
distinctions on NPR PPMs. On the other hand, it has been argued convincingly
that the market-based approach to consumer preference established in
Japan–Alcohol, and emulated in EC–Asbestos, resolves some of the environmental
shortcomings associated with a reluctance to acknowledge PPM distinctions
(Bronckers and McNelis, 2000: 374–378). This is because, under this approach, if
consumers clearly distinguish between physically identical products, so that they
are no longer competitive, it forms a strong basis for determining that they are not
‘ like’. This de-emphasizes aspects of the ‘ likeness’ test related to observable
product characteristics and end-uses.
Thus, a greater role for consumer preferences represents a useful evolution in the
PPMs debate. The problem that remains is methodological : how will these pre-
ferences be measured? ‘EC–Biofuels ’ illustrates these diﬃculties. With regard to
the econometric approach to consumer preferences, the Japan–Alcohol approach
contained, in particular, one requirement missing in ‘EC–Biofuels ’ : consumer
choice. The approach of measuring consumer preferences necessitated data and
surveys on purchasing behaviours, which most likely would not exist in this
scenario. The supply chain of most biofuels is probably more similar to that of
15 Some Member States vigorously oppose the approach of declaring products unlike due to diﬀer-
ences in NPR PPMs, On the other hand, in articles that also provide a useful overview of the controversy,
both Charnovitz (2002) and Howse and Regan (2000) argue that, with regard to WTO law, NPR PPM-
based distinctions are not necessarily illegal. There is a scarcity of WTO jurisprudence that directly
addresses the topic.
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asbestos, in that consumer preferences are not economically explicit. Within
Canada, asbestos was purchased by industrial consumers, and installed without
end-of-the-line consumers having any say. The same was true for asbestos sub-
stitutes in France. In the same way, it would be unlikely that consumers would
have much choice between sustainable and conventional biofuels, in either a
complaining or a responding country. Small-scale distribution channels might be
feasible for some types of biofuels, such as recycled cooking oil. However, given
the presumed diﬃculty of sourcing, transporting, and delivering fuels on a mass
scale, while a separate pump with sustainable biofuel is certainly an option, it
seems unlikely as an EU-wide practice. For the same reason, it seems unlikely that
econometric data could be drawn from a complainant country.
A uniﬁed ‘at the pump’ delivery infrastructure requires a degree of regulatory
involvement at the point of purchase. Rather than the individual or industrial
consumer, the state might be deeply implicated in deciding what kind of biofuels to
certify and import. This is a signiﬁcant departure from many existing labeling
schemes, such as Fair Trade and Forest Stewardship Council certiﬁcation, which
involve producing goods with superior ethics, as indicated by a label and/or ex-
plicit marketing, aimed at capturing a premium market share of alternative con-
sumers. The willingness of consumers to pay more for a product which supports
their environmental and social values underwrites the diversiﬁcation of market
choice. These types of voluntary schemes are much more immune from WTO
action, as the element of consumer choice is preserved, and there are no restrictions
on imports of uncertiﬁed or unlabelled goods. The fact that sustainability criteria
are being developed by the EC, to be applied by EU Member States, makes them
potentially more problematic, from a WTO perspective.
For this supply-chain related reason of lack of market choice, it would likely be
diﬃcult to amass data about consumer preferences using market-based surveys or
data like those in Japan–Alcohol. However, perhaps the notion of ‘measuring’
consumer preferences might be incorporated through another strategy, which does
not rely upon such economically explicit data. An attempt to measure consumer
preferences through surveys probably represents the best attempt to capture them
objectively. For example, surveys could be administered which queried consumers
for their views on sustainable versus conventional biofuels. The emphasis, of
course, would be on determining competitiveness between products.
To obtain this information, a survey would have to undertake a fairly nuanced
set of questions. If more than half of consumers stated that they would prefer
sustainable to conventional biofuels, this would represent a collective consumer
preference toward sustainable biofuels. Yet, if consumers said they would prefer
sustainable biofuels, would this mean that they would not purchase conventional
ones, if they were available, even if they were cheaper? If only conventional bio-
fuels were available, would consumers go further and boycott these? There is also
the problem that this type of data is speculative. Is there a gap between how
consumers would respond to such a survey, and how they would act in real life?
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Also, to use the word of the GATT Japan–Alcohol Panel, what if a regulation
supporting the use of sustainable biofuels ‘crystallized’ consumer preference to-
ward these biofuels? Would the presence of the regulation invalidate data gathered
about consumer preferences, as it did in Japan–Alcohol? In that case, would the
only legitimate data about consumer preferences be gathered from countries which
did not oﬀer sustainable biofuels? There is no real guidance within the WTO
system on how to deal with such complexities.
The objective approach 2: dismissing consumer preferences
In EC–Asbestos, the Panel concluded that the products in dispute were ‘ like’, and
then moved on to an analysis of whether the regulation represented less favourable
treatment of imported products. Due to lack of evidence, consumer preferences
were dismissed as ‘varied’. The public policy justiﬁcations behind the regulation
were considered in the context of Article XX, where they were not evaluated in
terms of consumer preferences, per se.
Of course, under EC–Asbestos, the Parties in dispute made no claims about
consumer preferences. Thus, the Panel had no evidence to go on. Had the Parties
undertaken surveys, there would have been more of a rigorous basis for their
conclusion. Clearly, an evidence-based approach is the best way to deal with
consumer preferences, though whether evidence is submitted is beyond the control
of the dispute settlement bodies.
In the event of an ‘EC–Biofuels’ dispute, it might prove impossible to measure,
or interpret, consumer preferences with any degree of accuracy. In this event,
the most rational and consistent approach, in its conformity with the stated juris-
prudence reviewed in this paper, would be to follow the Panel in EC–Asbestos, and
dismiss consumer preferences. In a sense, dismissal is unsatisfying, because con-
sumers seem to be such an important component of public policy. Undoubtedly, at
least some consumers have strong preferences. However, given the similarities
between physical characteristics and end-uses of the products, and lack of data on
consumer preferences, it would be easy to argue that sustainable and conventional
biofuels were ‘ like’, and then undertake the other steps of the analysis.
Based on the example of EC–Asbestos, it seems there is another force at work:
an intuition as to the degree of ethical controversy the issue will provoke. The
emphasis in determining ‘ likeness ’ has been product competitiveness. Would
consumers really refuse to buy conventional biofuels on a mass scale, making them
uncompetitive with sustainable ones? Perhaps, in ‘EC–Biofuels’, it would be easier
for the dispute settlement bodies to get away with dismissing consumer preferences
than in EC–Asbestos, on the argument that it was less likely to be such a contro-
versial issue for them.
The common sense approach
The example of ‘EC–Biofuels’ is instructive because it inspires thought about
what might happen if a common sense approach is applied in a more ethically
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ambiguous situation. International standards support the classiﬁcation of asbestos
as a carcinogen, whose use should be eliminated. This made the interpretation of
consumer preferences in EC–Asbestos fairly unambiguous. The controversial
nature of the dispute also inﬂuenced the AB to include this consideration under
Article III itself, rather than Article XX.
On the importance of sustainable production of biofuels, however, targeted in-
ternational standards are not so well established. For this reason, a common sense
interpretation would likely conclude that sustainability is less fundamental than,
for example, the preservation of human health. An implicit hierarchy of concerns
would likely be in operation, which reﬂected the extent to which the regulations in
question demonstrated broad-based societal norms. If the AB aﬃrmed, for ex-
ample, that consumers would ‘very likely’ prefer sustainable to conventional
biofuels, and that these preferences would impact upon the marketplace, this ar-
gument might prompt more criticism than it did in the EC–Asbestos decision.
If the dispute settlement bodies wanted to aﬃrm the legitimacy of sustainability
regulations under Article III, and be logically consistent, they would probably need
to adopt an ‘alternative comparator’, so that the relevant criteria for evaluating
product ‘ likeness’ consisted of environmental or social impact. Alternatively, they
could explicitly reinstitute the ‘aim-and-eﬀect ’ test.
Of course, there is no way of knowing what the dispute settlement bodies would
decide. However, if consumer preferences were to be considered relevant to the
dispute, and these preferences were interpreted, rather than measured, this in-
terpretation would grant a large degree of discretionary power to the dispute
settlement bodies. To resolve this problem, as the conclusion further discusses, it is
important to be clear about what ‘consumer preferences’ really means.
6. Conclusion
As well as biofuels sustainability criteria, the passage of climate change-related
regulations with potential to violate WTO rules provides a fresh opportunity to
establish how, precisely, the inﬂuence of consumer preferences should be incor-
porated, particularly in ethical public policy disputes. The issue is important, in the
context of the argument that consumer preferences can be used to distinguish
between products that would otherwise be seen as ‘ like’, for example sustainable
versus unsustainable, or carbon-intensive versus low-carbon, goods (Vranes,
2010).
Due to their ethical dimensions, disputes about public policy regulations, such as
climate change measures, are relevant to consumers in a crucial way. Yet, this
paper argues that they can become more diﬃcult to capture in these very circum-
stances. In EC–Asbestos, consumer preferences were not measured, in part because
the supply chain of the product in the complaining country and the import ban in
the responding country made gathering data in both places diﬃcult. Yet, they
were undeniably relevant. Perhaps because of this conundrum, the AB introduced
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consumer preference even though it required a contradictory approach. In fact, the
AB seemed to employ the same ‘subjective’ approach to consumers that it had so
clearly rejected both in Japan–Alcohol and EC–Asbestos itself. This temptation,
to use consumer preferences as a stand-in for discretionary action, may recur in
disputes that concern public policy regulations.
In such disputes, rather than actual consumers, the interpretation of consumer
preferences perhaps should be re-framed: it reﬂects more about societal norms.
Speciﬁcally, the more risky and controversial the public threat being forestalled by
a tax or regulation is seen to be, the larger the temptation to deal with it under
Article III, instead of Article XX, and, in the absence of data, to interpret consumer
preferences. In EC–Asbestos, the AB argued that they were evaluating consumer
preferences based upon competitiveness impacts. However, it is probably more
accurate to conclude that norms about protecting human health were universal
enough to intrude upon the primary, market-based purpose of Article III. This
clariﬁcation is a step toward a more rational approach. Unavoidably, in a dispute
such as EC–Asbestos, rather than consumers, the discussion concerns the less
market-based concept of ‘ the public’.
The diﬃculty with measuring consumer preferences, as documented in
EC–Asbestos, could simply be seen as a methodological failure. Canada and the
EC could have made their approach to consumers more ‘objective’ simply by
undertaking studies. They might have administered surveys that questioned con-
sumers about their views: did they see asbestos as a serious health threat, even if it
was installed using safer procedures? To improve methodologies for capturing
consumer preferences, more techniques could be applied, perhaps drawn from
other areas, such as Competition Law, which have already developed an arguably
more sophisticated approach to measuring consumer preferences (Choi, 2003:
17). With evidence to work with, the AB might have used an interpretative strategy
as objective as that employed in Japan–Alcohol.
Certainly, better methodologies would aid the AB in coming to a more demo-
cratic interpretation of consumer preferences. However, one important question
remains. Presumably, these responses would diﬀer in both countries, based upon
the presence, or absence, of a ban. Whose views would be ‘objective’? In GATT
Japan–Alcohol, the Panel aﬃrmed that a tax should not crystallize consumer pre-
ferences. Utilizing the same rationale, the Panel in WTO Japan–Alcohol rejected
data Japan had gathered about consumer preferences under the conditions of the
taxation policy in dispute. The underlying assumption, that government regulation
should not inﬂuence consumer preferences, is not surprising, given the free market
basis of the WTO. When applied to a public policy tax or regulation, however, the
extension of this logic has radical implications. It would mean, for example, that
consumer views in France, the country with the ban, would not be considered
relevant. It would also follow that governments should only establish regulations
whose source is measured consumer preferences. This invalidates the argument
that governments should inﬂuence consumer preferences in support of public
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policy goals. It also suggests that it is the responsibility of consumers, rather than
government, to be informed of public health threats, such as asbestos.
Despite the lack of homogeneity in the views of consumers, governments
routinely make normative regulations. The GATT Panel’s insistence that the tax
in Japan–Alcohol should not ‘crystallize’ consumer preferences is anathema to the
fact that, in some instances, government regulation does aﬀect consumer pre-
ferences. Through setting regulation, such as sustainability criteria, the state in-
ﬂuences consumers to adapt to shifting or emerging norms. Regulatory decisions
reﬂect national priorities, and there is certainly no guarantee that they beneﬁt the
public. Nor are states impartial guards of the global public good. Their regulatory
preferences likely reﬂect their economic priorities, one factor that makes the dis-
pute settlement bodies’ task so diﬃcult. Nevertheless, it is important that theWTO
system not act as a braking mechanism for more progressive regulations that
support emerging norms, such as, for example, regulations that support environ-
mental sustainability, or climate change mitigation.
A greater recognition of the authority of governments to inﬂuence consumer
preferences seems to call into question the fundamental ideological premise of the
WTO: the free market. On the other hand, if we think about the eﬀect on legal
reasoning, it can be argued that this recognition does not need to have such a
radical impact. There would be factual and legal implications for the Panel and
AB, respectively. Factually, the Panel would evaluate evidence obtained within the
context of a regulatory regime in dispute. If our hypothesis of government inﬂu-
ence on consumer preferences is correct, this would have the impact of providing
more WTO legitimacy for these regulations.
Legally, there might be a systematic approach for identifying progressive or
ethical regulations that merit the allowance of more government discretion.
Presumably, the ﬁrst step would be to establish criteria that distinguish these
regulations from other types. Given the discretionary range of the AB, there would
certainly be room for this within the existing Article III, and it might even clear up
inconsistencies between approaches to consumer preferences. The process of
establishing criteria, however, could be diﬃcult. For example, a government might
present its policy of mandating the purchase only of domestic products as an
ethical public policy regulation, though it is anathema to Article III. An attempt to
create general criteria which successfully addressed these and other problems
might be crushed under the weight of their own complexity.
This is particularly true as there is a better established way of approaching
essentially the same problem. This is to question whether Article III should ac-
commodate an aim and eﬀect or ‘alternative comparator’ approach that would
allow a larger set of concerns to contribute to the ‘like’ products determination,
or whether it should maintain its market-based orthodoxy. It may be that
EC–Asbestos represents a unique departure on the part of the AB, which was
prompted by an extraordinary set of circumstances: the lack of ambiguity in
the public policy value at stake (human health), and public pressure to avoid
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appearing insensitive to such concerns. These factors forced the AB to incorporate
non-competitiveness criteria into the ‘like’ products determination.
On the other hand, shunting such concerns to the category of ‘exceptions’ under
Article XX also might prompt controversy in other situations. If the dispute
settlement bodies wanted to adjust their norms, concluding that sustainably pro-
duced and conventional biofuels were not, in fact, ‘ like’ for example, they would
need to depart from the approach of Japan–Alcohol and EC–Asbestos. These dis-
putes take as their foundation the notion that ‘ like’ products are competitive
products. When product ‘ likeness ’ is measured through competitiveness, it un-
dermines the ability of the dispute settlement bodies to recognize extra-market,
ethical considerations as a legitimate basis for distinguishing products under
Article III, or to allow Member States to do so. If the dispute settlement bodies
considered whether sustainability standards for biofuels formed a violation of
Article III, an approach which considered only the competitiveness between con-
ventional and sustainably produced biofuels would likely fail to justify such
regulation. If, however, an ‘alternative comparator’ approach were applied, bio-
fuels could be diﬀerentiated because of their diﬀering environmental impact. This
determination would not rest on an illogical, discretionary interpretation of con-
sumer preferences. Thus, it is a better, more straightforward approach to in-
corporating non-trade societal norms in Article III.
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